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THE EFFECT OF SPLIT RATINGS ON BOND YIELDS
AND THE INFORMATIONAL QUALITY
OF RATING AGENCIES
Wesley M. J ones

INTRODUCTION
New bond issues are usually rated in terms of credit quality by two
prominent bond rating agencies-Moody's Investment Service and Standard
and Poor 's.
Prior work by Ederington, Yawitz and Roberts (1987) has
indicated that the market perceives this rating activity to be of some value.
However, occasionally the two agencies will disagree on the quality of a new
issue. Studies by Ederington (1986), Liu and Moore (1987), and Thompson
and Vaz (1990) have suggested that disagreement among the rati ng agencies
implies additional risk to the market and leads to higher required yields for
those issues when compared to similar issues that are commonly rated by the
two agencies. Alternatively, Miller 's (1977) wor k on divergent opinions
suggests that under conditions of heterogeneou s expectations and limited
supply, investors with the most optimistic opinions will be the principal
buyers of an issue and, consequently, cause the m ean price for the issue in the
market to be higher and, by extension, returns to be lower tha n would be
obtained from conditions of homogeneous expectations and unlimited supply.
The split rating event provides an opportunity to test whether systematic
pricing differences are related to the split rating, whether the market
systematically judges the rating of one rating agency to be superior , and
whether systematic price differences support Miller's divergent opinions
hypothesis.

HYPOTHESES
T h e Optimis t. Pull Hypo th esis
H0 :

There is no difference between the excess offering yield of a split
rated issue and the excess offeri ng yield of a commonly rated
issue.

HA:

Split rated issues will-by virtue of a hig her average price-have
a lower excess offering yield than a commonly rated issue.

Based on Miller 's prior work on divergent opinions, the optimist pull
hypothesis suggests that the market perceives the quality rating of a new
bond issue to be an unbiased estimate of the issue's true quality, and bonds
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with split ratings will be systematically priced higher than similar commonly
rated issues that are rated at the lower rating of the split. The rationale for
this is that optimistic market participants-by virtue of being optimistic-will choose to believe the higher rating in the split and will price the issue
accordingly. Given that supply of the issue is limited, the optimists will be the
purchasers until their demand is satisfied, thus pulling up the mean price
paid for the issue. For example, a new issue receiving a split ratingA/BBB-will be systematically priced higher than similar issues commonly
rated at BBB. This systematic pricing difference will persist regardless of
which agency is responsible for the higher rating in the split.

Pessimist Push Hypothesis

H,,:

No difference exists between the excess offering yield of a split
rated issue and the excess offering yield of a commonly r ated
issue.

HA:

Split rated issues will-by virtue of a lower average price-have a higher excess offering yield than a commonly r ated
issue.

The Pessimist Push Hypothesis suggests that the market will only
perceive the disagreement over the quality of the issue as adding uncertainty
to the issue. The market would, therefore, lower its expectations, and price
for, the issue as a r esult of the increased risk. Under this hypothesis, split
rated issues will be systematically priced below similar issues that are
commonly rated at the higher rating in the split. For example, a new issue
that is split rated A/BBB will be systematically priced below similar issues
that are commonly rated AJA. Also, this pricing penalty will persist
regardless of which rating agency is r esponsible for which rating in the split.

The Agency Clie ntele Hypothesis

H,,:

If an issue has a split rating, no difference will exist between

HA:

If an issue is split rated, a difference will exist in excess yield

the excess offering yield of an issue rated higher by Moody's
and an issue rated higher by Standard and Poor's.
conditioned on which rating agency gives the issue the higher
rating.

A third possible outcome exists with respect to split ratings as well. If one
rating agency is perceived as possessing superior resources to the competing
rating agency, then the market price of split rated issues will systematically
follow the rating of the agency with the superior resources. For example,
assume that the market perceives Standard & Poor's (S&P's) to have superior
resources to Moody's and, consequently, that S&P's r atings are superior to
18
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Moody's in terms of information content. A new issue r eceiving a split rating
of As,.p / BBB"°"""' will be systematically priced higher than similar issues
commonly rated BBB/BBB. Conversely, a new issue receiving a split rating
of A,.,ood,.., / BBB""r will be systematically priced lower than similar issues
commonly rated A/A.
MODELS

To test the first two hypotheses-Optimist Pull and Pessimist Push-the
following multiple linear regression model is specified.
(1)

X'l, is the offering yield on bond issue i in excess of the yield on threemonth treasury bills on the date issue i is floated using three month T-bills
as baseline accounts for the investor's ability to "undo" a fixed income
investment that, in retrospect, is deemed undesirable. Term, is the original
term to maturity of the issue. Modern finance theory would suggest that the
longer an investor's money is placed at risk, the greater should be the return
required for taking such risk. If term to maturity has any explanatory power
on excess offering yield, it is expected that a longer term to maturity would
lead to a higher excess yield. Spec, is a binary indicator variable that is set
equal to 1 for issues that are speculative by rating (Moody's Baa or lower ).
Moody's rating is chosen to determine whether an issue is speculative because
previous work by Liu and Moore (1987) and Perry, Evans, and Liu (1991)
suggests that when a split rating occurs, the market tends to place greater
importance on the Moody's rating than the Standard and Poor's rating. It is
expected that the speculative flag on an issue will increase excess yield. Call,
is a binary classification variable that is equal to 1 if an issue is callable prior
to maturity and O otherwise. The presence of a call provision on an issue
pr ovides the issuer with the option to redeem an issue prematurely if, after a
time, market conditions are such that they can achieve lower interest costs.
However, the ability of the issuer to capture lower rates also means that the
investor must accept a lower return for the same amount of risk. Therefore,
it is expected that the presence of a call provision will result in a higher excess
yield. Split, is the binary indicator vanable that is set equal to 1 if the issue
has a split rating, and O otherwise. The Optimist Pull hypothesis, which is
consistent with Miller's Heterogeneous Expectations hypothesis, would
suggest that the split variable would be negatively related t-0 excess yield
because, if the optimists in the market are dictating the average price under
conditions of limited supply then the average price should be higher than if
the issue were commonly rated. A higher average price would lead to a lower
offering yield and, consequently, a lower excess yield. The pessimist push
hypothesis, which is consistent with prior work by Liu and Moore (1987),
wou ld suggest that the split variable would be positively related to excess
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~eld bec~use the additional risk implied by the rating differences will be
~puted m low_er market price for such issues. A lower price will lead to a
higher offermg yield and a higher excess yield.
To test the Clientele hypothesis, the following model is specified.

XY, = u + B,Term, + Bppec, +

rjpa1z. + B,Modontop, +B.SPontop, + E,

(2)

The variables Term, Spec, and Call are defined the same as in the
previous model. The variable Modontop, is a binary indicator variable that is
set equal to 1 if, for a given split rated issue, Moody's gives the issue the
higher rating. Spontop, is a binary indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if
for a given split rated issue, Standard & Poor's gives the issue the highe;
rating. Commonly rated issues will have both indicators set equal to O, which
would be consistent with a split rating indicator of O in Model 1.

DATA
The data for this study are drawn from an extensive historical database
of new bond issues between the years of 1983 and 1993 developed by the
Capital Markets Division of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. This
database reports offering yield, original term, and credit quality rating from
Moody's Investor's Service and Standard and Poor's for each issue as well as
other information regarding s pecific characteristics of each issue. The data
are examined and any issu e that is not rated by both rating agencies is
eliminated . This filtering reduces the available data set from 6,562 issues to
5,842 issues. The ra te on thirty-day t-bills is added from another data file
maintained by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and the difference
between the offering yield on the bond issue and the thirty day t-bill is the
excess offering yield.

METHODOLOGY
A multiple linear regression of excess offering yield (XYTB03) o~ Term,
Spec, Callable, and Split is performed. The results of the regression are
presented in Table 1.
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TABLE 1

Variable

Coefficient

T-Statistic

P-Value

Constant

3.253

60.404

0.000

Split

0.047

0.713

0.476

Term

-0.007

-2.744

0.006

Spec

1.203

22.772

0.000

-0.034

-0.576

0.565

Callable
R2 = .293

The results suggest that the excess offering yield on issues in this sample
is expla ined by the term to maturity of the issue a nd whether the issue carries
a specula tive nag. The results do not a ppea r to support either the optimist
pull or the pessimist pu h hypotheses of ma rket ex pectation. The existence of
a spli t rating does not ha ve a ny effect on the excess yield of the issue in the
marke t. This finding is con trary to previous work by Ede ringto n (1986), Liu
and Moore ( 19 7), and Thompson a nd Vaz 0990 ), which s uggested tha t a s plit
ra ting implied increased ris k that would raise the excess yield investors
require to buy the issue. These results also do not le nd su pport to Mille r'
Heterogeneous Expectations Model.
It i inte resting to note that the fact that an issue i callable also ha no
impact on the excess o!Tering yield required in the market. The ex:istence of a call
feature represents an option to the issuing firm, the value of which should be a
co t to the investor. Perha ps the lack of effect of the call feature can be defended
by assuming that investors have the a bility to "undo·• prior transactions a t a ny
time a nd investme nt horizons a re short enough that investors plan to undo their
investments before the call protection period has passed.
To test the Age ncy Clientele Hypothesis, a multiple linear regression of
excess offering yield (XYTB03) on term to maturity, the existe nce of a
s peculative n ag, whether the issue is callable, a nd which rating agency, if any,
gave th e issue a highe r rating, 1s performed. The result of the regression are
prese nted in Table 2.
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TABLE 2
Variable

Coefficient

T-Statistic

P-Value

3.262

60.821

0.000

Tenn

-0.008

-2.799

0.005

Spec

1.202

22.847

0.000

Callable

-0.055

-0.937

0.349

S&P Higher

-0.403

-4.466

0.000

0.454

5.258

0.000

Constant

Moody's Higher
R2 = 0.307

As in the previous analysis, the existence of a speculative flag on the
issue, as well as the term to maturity, possesses explanatory power on excess
offering yield. However, contrary to work by Liu and Moor e (1987) and Perry,
Evans, and Liu (1991) that suggests that the market prefers to believe the
r ating of Moody's when an issue has a split rating, these data seem t.o suggest
the opposite. Issues in this sample rated higher by Standard and Poor's than
by Moody's have an excess offering yield that is appr oximately 40 basis points
lower than commonly rated issues. In contrast, issues in this sample that are
rated lower by Standard and Poor's (higher by Moody's) have an excess
offering yield that is appr oximately 45 basis points higher than commonly
rated issues. These two r esults together suggest that the excess offering yield
follows more closely the r ating determination of Standard and Poor's.

CONCLUSION
While support of Miller's Heterogeneous Expectations Model was not
evidenced by analysis of this sample, it cannot be said that the theory was
proved invalid, only that this study failed t.o support it. This study did not
produce significant contradiction to the null hypothesis that the presence of a
split rating does not a ffect the offering yield on bond issues. In summary, it
cannot be concluded that the mere existence of a split rating on a new bond
issue affects the issue's yield .
It is interesting to find that when t he direction of the split rating is
consider ed, a paradigm shift appears to have occurred since the studies of~iu
and Moore (1987) and Perry, Evans, and Liu (1991) that examined whi0
r ating agency has the "better" rating. The current study found that splitr ated issues that received a higher rating from Standard and Poor 's were
22
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priced higher in the market. At the same time, split-rated issues that
r eceived a lower rating from Standard and Poor 's (a higher Moody's rating)
were priced lower in the market. These two opposing events might explain
why Lhe single indicator of split rating did not appear significant.
The results of this study pr ovide an opportunity for issuing ftrms to
minimize the cost of input debt capital in the event that their debt will not be
commonly rated by both agencies. As this study suggests that the market
tends to prefer Standard and Poor's rati ngs to Moody's ratings, it might be m
the best inter est of the issuer to request a Standard and Poor's rating as a
companion to the Moody's rating. If the Standard and Poor's rating is
r epor ted lower than the Moody's rating, then the issuing ftrm can appeal the
Standard and Poor's r ating and attempt to raise it above that of Moody's.
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